Introduction
A crisis cannot last forever. After all the cyclical pattern of the economy is a well known aspect of long term growth. What is less often said is that to get out of the crisis implies that the economy will have to settle into a new growth pattern. The length and severity of the slump are of course important, but so is the new pattern that will emerge. It inevitably implies one of two things: a step forward, or a step backward, an improvement or a deterioration with respect to the previous situation. How are economists and economic theory coping with these two questions, that of the economic policy capable of getting the US economy out of the slump and what kind of new pattern will it promote in the long run ? 1 During this past year the debate has been: will it be a V shape (sharp down, sharp up), a U shape (plunge, then flat, then sharp recovery), or an L (sharp down and stay down) shaped crisis? Or perhaps a W (a false recovery in the middle)? Underneath is the long run question, which seems appropriate since the comparison is often made with the Great Depression. That is the background of the debate the policies of the Obama administration, and the stimulation package in particular, and but also that on economic science. Mostly incapable of anticipating the crisis, the economic profession is itself in a middle of a crisis.
1 While focusing on the US economy the analysis does apply to most industrialized economies and especially to the EU. There are of course differences but the main trust of the argument concerning the relationship between the crisis and long term depression is the same.
Casting doubts on the theory a serious downturn as the one we observe should work as a stimulus to critical examination of economic analysis.
The paper wants to contribute to these questions first highlighting the debate on the theory guiding macro policy. The views expressed by Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman indicate the way economic theory is brought again to task by the crisis, suggesting that only with a return to Keynes can we face the current recession. But is a rehearsal of the debate between Keynesian and non (or less) Keynesian economists telling the entire story of the current crisis? Or is it opening a larger set of questions for the history of economic analysis?
We attempt to argue that there is indeed more on the table. Keynesian interpretations of the crisis focus on unpredictable behavior, markets imperfections and the "human" element. For one thing, this seems to reignite the debate on rationality vs."irrational" behaviour, really a fundamental question in the way of approaching the working of the market economy. However, precisely the characteristics of the current crisis suggest a deeper question that has been neglected in the debate. It concerns the long run and in particular the creation of new markets. Even if the short term crisis is overcome, without too terrible a deficit, the long term contains a different set of problems, and they are mostly absent in the debate among economists. That puts in a different light also the debate on the stimulation package.
Indeed, the crisis highlights a fundamental problem: Keynesian theory cannot make a decisive come back unless it takes step forward in term of analysis and re-orientation. This is were a history of economic analysis perspective can help to refine and address the questions substantiating a turn in theory and policy.
1-Crisis and long term depression
The real crisis affecting the US and all the advanced industrial economies appears to be a failure of aggregate demand, itself the consequence of the financial crisis, which caused credit to dry up. With credit not available, household consumption slumped and business investment collapsed. This itself is not uncontroversial but it is mostly accepted. To counteract the recession, policies have increased government spending. Consumption and Investment were down, exports could not be stimulated by policy -and in fact fell because of the spread of the crisis worldwide, and while imports declined as unemployment rose (less consumer spending meant fewer imports), this barely offset the fall in exports. So the only thing to do was increase government expenditure. As a result there has been a considerable amount of debate around the 'stimulus packages' approved by the Obama administration, as well as those of other countries. According to some it is working and will get out the US economy from the slump. Other have argued that much more is needed to face such a serious crisis.
Hope and optimism are cautiously voiced by the Obama Administration in the persons of Geithner and Summers. It rests on the improving balance sheets of banks and the sense that the virtuous cycle of finance is restarting. Here we find the argument that runs through the last twenty years: the expansion of US economy and the world economy it all depends on Wall Street. If you create the conditions for a rise of Wall Street, the optimism will lead us into a new phase of expansion. And it is said these conditions are in the making, starting from the improvement of the banking industry and the new profits of investment banking. Indeed we have observed a remarkable rebound of the stock markets after a series of "adjustments" in the second part of 2008 and from the lows of March 2009. That many expect will pull the world economy out of the recession.
We must note that a recovery of finance is predicated upon a better and stricter regulation. More regulation will help, but is seem clear that it would not be a change in the game. Would it lead to investment on a massive scale, which is required to resurrect robust growth ? Many are arguing and among these Robert Reich that we cannot rely on the same mechanisms that have kept the economy running. Indeed, the economy cannot restart because it cannot go back to where it was before. That is why he provocatively speaks of an X shaped crisis. (CommonDreams.org) Indeed the outlook is not encouraging. The Obama administration and the Federal Reserve, but also the BCE and the OECD, have been saying that at the end of 2009 we are seeing an improvement and the way out of the crisis, although the recovery will be slow and especially unemployment will be high and persistent for quite some time.
The outlook on growth for 2008 shows positive rates only for China and India -with a few other exceptions -and it will be most likely confirmed by 2009 data. Especially in Europe and the UK unemployment is reaching new highs. Recent EU official projections indicate it will continue to rise even as GNP growth rates will turn positive in 2010 and 2011. In the US unemployment figures are around 10%, but considering discouraged workers and parttime unemployment (many companies do not to lay off completely their workers) may be as high as 16-18 %. That suggests a slump of the order of magnitude of the Great Depression. At best, in the second part of 2009 jobs were lost at a decreasing rate. At the same time we are seen how serious is the downturn in leading advanced economies such as Germany and Japan, suggesting that also export-led growth needs rethinking.
So at the center of the stage is the question the size and characteristics of the stimulation package. It has also been widely criticized as being to weak, especially in Europe. Paul Krugman has repeatedly called attention to that. And he is not the only one. Other have indeed argued that much larger deficit spending is needed to face the crisis. While the debate between economists focuses on the merits of deficits, 2 there is certain silence on the nature of the crisis and the way a fiscal stimulus might re-start the economy even between those advocating fiscal policy and deficit spending. Underneath the idea that deficits will drive the economy out of the recession and re-establish a reasonably stable growth process. But very little is said on such a growth process.
-The crisis and economic theory
It was said that economists, with a few exceptions, were mostly caught by surprise by the eruption of the crisis. That however was not new, considering the similar reaction only a few years earlier when the expansion of the 1990s collapsed over the burst of the technology bubble. That did not prevent them from overlooking the inflating of the real estate bubble in the 2000s.
The problem is with the approach of mainstream macro theory and with the overwhelming role that financial economists have come to play, argues Paul Krugman (2009) . Ultimately both have to their roots on two hypotheses: agents' rational behaviour and market perfection. The idea that theory had it all under control, including the tools to overcome economic depression, lies at the basis of a often voiced consensus. (Krugman mentions statements to that effect by Blanchard, Lucas and Bernanke before the crisis.)
Since Adam Smith the message had been "trust the market"; that was called into question precisely by the Great Depression. Keynes challenged the idea that market economies could work without supervision. Especially it was skeptical about financial markets that, Krugman recalls, he compared to Casinos. That stands in sharp contrast with the leading role played by the theory of financial markets, according to which market operate efficiently, correctly pricing assets on the basis of all available information. The rational investor would evaluate risk and returns; the capm (capital asset pricing model) has become the basis not only of portfolio decisions but also for the pricing for derivatives.
The hypothesis of efficient markets was advanced by Eugene Fama in the 1970s and further developed in the 1980s by Michael Jensen. The theory gained dominance despite the periodical collapses of the stock market, such as those of 1974-73 and 1987 . Its credibility is based on much statistical evidence, but the focus, Krugman observes, is on comparing assets prices, never asking the question of the underlying flow of returns.
So, while by the1970s irrationality, bubbles and disastrous speculation were virtually cancelled in the theory of financial markets, in macroeconomics Keynes'response to the great depression was also almost completely forgotten. It focused the possibility of an insufficient level of demand as the key problem driving a depression. The question has deep and well known roots in the history of economic thought, particularly in the debate between Malthus and Ricardo on the general glut, although that debate, and Keynes views on that question, rarely appear in macroeconomics. Krugman argues that Keynes' view of the great depression had two different answers: the neoclassical purists (Lucas) simply would call that nonsense; there cannot be failure of effective demand and thus there aren't. Lucas provided an alternative, and later Prescott another. On the other side are those Krugman calls pragmatists. G.Mankiw, O. Blanchard, and David Romer to some extent did accept the Keynesian notion of a demand failure and thus that government intervention was desirable. They too however were fascinated by the notion of rational individuals and perfect markets and did not want to depart much from the orthodoxy. Krugman then points out that these differences were played down by the fact that policy intervention was focused on monetary policy; as long as fiscal policy was not called on to fight recession, the purists were willing to let it go.
This had a lot to do with the fact that between 1985 and 2007 recessions were mild and inflation was under control. The very success of the Federal reserve in overcoming the 2001 recession after the burst of the technological bubble seems to have contributed to discard the possibility of a new bubble developing in the real estate sector. Both Greenspan in 2004 and Bernanke in 2005 ruled out such a possibility. Houses prices were simply reflecting strong fundamentals. 3 The current crisis has changed all of that. It brought down the edifice based on rationality and perfect markets of the purists and left the pragmatists to observe that whereas successful in 1990 and 2001, lowering short term interest rates is not working this time, since at the end of 2008 the rates had already reached the "zero lower bound".
Krugman analysis indicates that both theory (which ultimately suggests that a recession driven by demand shortages cannot occur) and policy (if it does occur it can be managed by the central bank through appropriate monetary policies) are dealing with a nut they cannot crack. This is the meaning of the current crisis. It forced a change of policy. The Obama administration refocused attention of the fiscal stimulus, re-establishing a Keynesian orientation in the management of the crisis. If we then ask the question of what the economic doctrine can do to overcome the crisis, the message is that unless it goes back to Keynes ideas and fully takes them into account it is doomed to failure and cannot address effectively the question of crisis and depression. 4 According to Akerlof and Schiller (2009) the main point is that Keynes thought that much economic activity is driven by animal spirits. They ultimately account for economic fluctuations and involuntary unemployment. Government intervention is required to counteract the negative effects of animal spirits, and in particular episodes of exuberance and panic. The difference between classicism and keynesian theory is then the trust on rationality as the key to economic decisions. They elaborate on the effects of the "irrational" component and argue that it affects trust, equity, corruption and antisocial behaviour, monetary illusion and finally the narratives that influence economic behaviour and are rooted in who we are and what we do. Through these channels animal spirits can explain phenomena like depression, unemployment, volatility in financial prices and investments, cyclical patterns in the real estate market. They argue that the current financial crisis is not just a shortage of demand, which is customarily addressed by a mix of monetary policy and fiscal stimulus. The problem is the contraction of credit. Its causes are in the change introduced by the "new finance". The narrative holding in the years of its rise was that new financial products were tools to manage risk, which they were, at least at an initial stage. As these products spread and grew more complex and complicated, the narrative changed; it suggested that these financial products were ways to sell false remedies. As the new narrative about the nature of Wall Street and its financial transactions took hold the demand for these "exotic" products collapsed and the credit crunch began.
Akerlof and Schiller argue that this approach is part of an emerging field of studies called behavioural economics, which attempts to explain the real functioning of the economy when the human element is taken into account. Reconsidering Keynes'notion of animal spirits they indicate how his fundamental message must be understood and developed to manage what are indeed imperfect markets.
There is a remarkable similarity with the conclusion reached by Krugman. Economists, he argues, should accept the fact that financial markets are far from being perfect. Macroeconomics should the incorporate the reality of financial market and accept that the Keynesian theory is still the best framework for the analysis of recessions. That has a price: giving up "the clarity completeness and exquisite beauty of neoclassical economics." The assumption of rationality and perfect markets might provide a precise but wrong answer. Economists should then be content with a view that, although less clear, we can hope to be at least partially correct. In other words, they must trade elegance for relevance. What is relevant are the limitations of human rationality and economic institutions, the shortcoming of markets and the dangers created when regulators do not trust regulation. This sets out a research and intellectual agenda where prominent questions are irrational and unpredictable behavior and markets imperfections. At the theoretical level that implies to accept that a complete theory is a distant goal; at the policy level that implies prudence and less readiness to dismantle regulatory mechanisms, supposedly taken over by the market.
Economics as a disciple will have refocus attention on "mistakes and tensions", although that might be less fascinating than market perfection. Behavioral finance stresses that investors are far less rational than they are supposed to be. On the contrary they are prone to exuberance and panic. Herd behavior dominates their choices and that is reinforced by problems of trust, credibility and limited warranty. Indeed, there is an entire new approach, called behavioral economics, trying to explain investors'irrational behavior and how that leads to financial markets instability.
If these are the lines for a "go back to Keynes" re-orientation of theory and policy, when he comes to the reasons of the demise of Keynesian economics, despite the overwhelming influence it had gained since the 1930s, Krugman argues that economists have confused mathematically dressed beauty with truth. Not a secondary mistake, but it was made possible by the fading away of the recollection of the Great Depression and mass unemployment. That contributed to re-establish an idealized economy in which unemployment was a voluntary phenomenon. In that framework the Minsky's question "could it happen again ?" simply does not arise.
As pointed out above a large part of the failure of the economic profession has to do with the course taken by macroeconomics and especially the importance of financial economists spreading the idea that markets are efficient. A dissenting voice comes precisely from an investment banker at Goldman and Sachs. John R. Talbott anticipated in two books both the Internet bubble and the next to happen burst of the real estate bubble. It would be interesting to analyze in detail how he came to forecast so accurately these phenomena. A good guess is that it much depended on the "The 86 biggest lies on Wall Street", as the title his most recent book (2009) reads. We want to mention it because one finds there a criticism of the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve that is somewhat missing in Krugman reconstruction of how the economic profession failed to anticipate the crisis.
According to Talbott one of the problem of the current crisis is precisely Bernanke analysis of the Great Depression. They are both seen as liquidity crises; injecting enough liquidity would cure the problem. This was certainly done and it might have stopped the collapse of the banking system. However, the remedy may not reach into what is necessary for a sustained recovery. A second interesting point is that the reduction in money supply and the liquidity crisis, Talbott argues, was a result of the depression, not its cause. Today the problem is not so much liquidity per se, but the danger of banks failure and that has deeper roots in finance, real economy and lack of regulation. In particular he single out one fundamental trend of the real economy as a determining element of the crisis; the wages standstill, despite continuing productivity growth. That, and not innovation, new markets and good management, drove the rise of the stock market. Preventing wage inflation was almost an obsession for Alan Greenspan. But that success is the fundamental reason of the successive unbalances experienced by the economy.
-The stimulus and deficits

The making of the crisis
It is however remarkable that, despite the grip of the orthodoxy, concerns about the deficits and government intervention were wiped out by the eruption of the crisis and particularly after Lehman Brothers failure. Years and years of debate between economists appeared overshadowed by the seriousness of the danger. Vastly perceived as devastating the combined effects of a credit crisis and a real economy crisis served to pass a mix of policies including the stimulus package that marked the beginning of the Obama administration, while most industrial economies did act along similar lines.
To see the seriousness of the challenge we ought to take a step backward and look at the actual making of the current crisis. The phenomena that contributed to the crisis are rooted in the 1990s. Indeed, the collapse of that expansion and the recovery that followed precipitated the crisis of the second part of the 2000s.
Slowdown and resilience: 2000-2003
The collapse of the growth scenario of the 1990s and the burst of Hi-Tech bubble at the beginning of 2000 determined the turning around of the cycle. The downturn of the economy began in 2001.
5 But is was not as bad as the collapse of investment and the "correction" of stock market would have suggested.
Critics of the 1990s expansion who had focused on the piling up of households debt as the key to consumption spending, such as Wynne Goodley, (2000) would argue that when families hit the bedrock of the debt and stop consuming, with little help coming from the government budget, then the economy was bound to slowdown.
6 That did happen. Still, the economy as a whole did not crash. At least not in the first part of the 2000s. Why? Fiscal policy has a role, although here we must probably use an extra amount of caution.
As pointed out by Stiglitz (2003) , changes in fiscal policy are taking place already in the 1990s, but they took a decisively harder turn with the W. Bush Administration. The two major features of fiscal policy were military expenditure and tax cuts on dividends. As a result of more spending and less revenues, and the declining income since the downturn began, there was a boom in the Government deficit. Indeed, as in most of the world, right wing politics is not afraid of deficits, certainly less than the moderate left. However, it is not indifferent how the money is spent. The deficit in the Bush administration is mainly the result of cutting taxes for the rich and waging war. The expansionary effects, giving the transmission channels, are weak, except may be the contracts to the industries working for the military. So the overall expansionary effects of the deficit were weak, certainly much less than the stimulus required after the retreat of private spending.
While the stock market went into a long deep correction phase, real estate prices were instead sustained and provided a powerful channel to back households debt. That was facilitated by the "easy money", the accommodating monetary policy of the Federal Reserve and lowest than ever interest rates. That, however, shifted the burden of driving growth to the real estate market. And that did not last very long either.
Real estate values, which have been rising throughout the 1990s, were an important element of the expansion. The mechanism through which they contributed to growth is essentially the possibility of contracting cheap mortgages, because of low interests rates, and then borrow against rising home values. This had a positive influence on consumption spending, regardless of personal income dynamics.
7 Demand sustained houses prices, and real estate values worked to ensure credit to households that had accumulated debt to unprecedented levels on their credit cards (Manning, 2000) . This had an important role in preventing the stagnation of the early 2000s to become a more severe slump. In fact, the positive effect continued till the house market remained strong and houses prices high. Sustained by consumption spending and house sales, overall aggregate demand showed a remarkable resilience. Then of course one should not forget the stimulus coming from the finally enacted tax cuts and the jump of military spending, which as pointed out above are the backbone of the Bush Administration economic policy. Though part of a fiscal policy subject to severe criticism, they can have an expansionary, although short-lived and relatively weak, expansionary effect.
In sum: consumption spending remained relatively vigorous in the middle of such a serious downturn, which, combined with other reasons, contributed to keep the economy afloat. However, considering other major facts affecting the US economy in the 2000s, such as war and rising oil prices, it was still unclear at the end of 2003 whether there was going to be any kind of expansion at all. The growth scenario was a combination of weakness remaining in GDP growth, employment, wages, stock market. The US economy had gone from a boom to a phase of uncertainty and stagnation, which it was still experiencing, despite the signs of having reached the bottom. 
Recovery and crisis: 2004-2008
The economy did go back to more solid growth and the idea of a new phase of expansion did take hold. The new Fed Chairman Bernanke at the beginning of his tenure focused on inflation, in fact core inflation.
9 Despite the raising energy costs and the hurricane(s) economic growth was back and inflation pressures were not so bad. That overlooked the fact that the recovery fundamentally depended on the expansion of credit to households willing to buy their homes, with little else -contrary to the 1990s -contributing to aggregate spending. That exacerbated the problem that had been building over the years. With no new leading sectors driving growth, consumption spending could be sustained only through debt resting on the real estate market. The problem was going to surface soon with the burst of the real estate bubble. Manning (2005) argues that the real estate bubble in the 2000s was a substitute for the 1990s Hi-Tech bubble. All bubbles must burst, and this one did too. However, that took a few years to materialize. Despite weakness in wages and income growth, rising real estate values continued to provide credit for consumers that had already reached the limit on their credit cards. Indeed, that prevented a wave of personal bankruptcies. Real estate values kept rising because a larger and larger number of buyers were attracted into the market by the combination of low interest payments, especially for the first two-three years, and a relaxation of the conditions required to obtain mortgages. Attracting into the market low income, risky clients kept the mechanism running. But this was the last phase of the bubble, and the beginning, in 2006, of the turn around of the real estate market.
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When interest payments went up, these buyers could not meet their obligations. Banks repossessed properties, but these could not be sold and their prices fell. This brought to the crisis of 2007. Manning argues that it was only a first act in the real estate bubble drama. A second one would involve more wealthy home owners that might find themselves with an unsustainable debt in the face of sliding real estate values. Unless, of course, the market rapidly improves.
It becomes clear that in the 2000s the recovery prepared the crisis of the later years. The sub-prime loans crisis did start a generalized debt and liquidity crisis, threatening the banking system and the real economy. It prompted the Federal Reserve, together with other major central banks, and US Treasury to intervene on a massive scale, setting aside worries about deficit and inflation. That has not prevented the economy to enter a severe recession. Observing the dramatic reversal of the policy stance that had argued and almost preached against government intervention and supported an increasing deregulation of financial markets, economists and commentators have spoken of the end of a phase. For a new one to begin it must articulate a strategy that, while getting the economy out of the recession, reestablishes prospects for long run growth.
The stimulus and the deficit
Krugman outlines why dominant economic theory, including Greenspan and Bernanke, did not see the real estate bubble developing. However, the analysis above highlights that it was as an almost necessary outcome of the end of the 1990s expansion and more specifically of the collapse of the latest technology driven stimulus to productivity growth and structural change. (Gualerzi and Nell, forthcoming) It was a coming to terms with a number of unbalances and especially an accumulation of private debt that had gone since the 1990s.
It is not then hard to see a return to a fiscal stimulus consensus. Although unclear whether this is a fundamental reorientation of policy or just a way to cope with a tremendous blow dealt to the economy, the stimulus appeared the only way out. The fact is that the economic policy pursued by the Obama administration, and most of the industrialized economies, can be summarized in a sentence: Save the banks and stimulate the economy. Too bad that both imply a rising burden of government debt.
Indeed, while one side calls for more stimulus, the other worries about driving up the deficit. A stimulus might cure a crisis, a deficit could interfere with future monetary and fiscal policy. Indeed, a common critique is that even if the stimulus/bailout package works temporarily, it will fail in the long run because of the burden of debt it will create. A short boost comes at the price of a long term drag. The doctrine of Fiscal Austerity, preached for decades, was set aside for a time by fear of the depression, but it is already making a comeback. Paul Samuelson has argued that spending and spending now is the only remedy (Tribune Media Services, Inc., La Stampa, July 18, 2009), not the recuperation of finance, as Treasury Secretary Geithner seems to think. Engulfing the market with new sophisticated instruments, financial innovation destroyed market transparency. It is not then the time to worry about deficits. We have to worry about the real economy and employment. The New Deal taught us, he says, that only with a resumption of consumption spending will the economy overcome the crisis.
But, let's suppose that the stimulation package works. Even more, suppose that Samuelson advise it fully received, that is, assume a massive stimulus, can we expect that to result in a new boom and a sustained expansion? Even if fiscal austerity is set aside, that should not overlook the different circumstances in which the stimulus takes place. That ultimately accounts for its long term consequences. More than the burden of debt we should pay attention to the ways in which the stimulus may restart the economy sustaining consumption and investment. But we might look at the problem in another way also. The bulk of the argument about he burden of debt is that it will affects negatively interest rates, therefore discouraging private investment. But this is precisely the point, what does it take to bring back investment into the picture? Focusing on new markets a better story about investment can be told, beyond that customarily focused on the interest rate.
Deficits and markets
The alleged dangers of deficits can be seen in a different light looking at history. One example behind us is that of the war economy between 1943-1945. Another is the "golden age" of the 1960s.
The stimulus of World War II, based on deficits of more that 25% of GNP for three years running, and accompanied by massive planning, price controls, export controls, control over financial markets, and labour directives, decisively ended the depression. The deficit did not have any impact during the war because interest rates were held down, and finance was planned, but it did not matter later either, because growth was really on solid ground. By the 1960s growth had been so strong and so steady that the ratio of debt to GNP was back in the normal range. These were certainly exceptional circumstances.
Circumstances were also dramatically different in the 1960s. Those expansion years were marked by the maturity of mass consumption and it was combined with the boom of new industries such as air transportation and television. Electronics was in its infancy, but the markets for durable reached indeed a stage of maturity with large growth in sales and income in the industries producing automobiles and electric appliances. Besides there was a boom in real estate. The GI Bill had created an enormous market for buying houses and distributed income on a massive scale. Government provided guarantees on mortgages and that encouraged the housing market. But Government provided support for automobiles purchases and college tuition also. In general, full employment macro policy and union pressures raising wages led to a large re-distribution of income.
Circumstances were then positive from the point of view of a large spending capacity, therefore on the side of demand, and new markets were sustained by the products of rapidly expanding new industries. Both the maturing of mass consumption industries and new industries in the stricter sense of the word, providing new products and new services, were made possible by the massive use of new technologies. Part of this came with the adaptation of war technology for civilian uses. The effects of new technologies on new markets were driven by investment that contributed to create the modern industry dominated by large corporations. The whole the process was intertwined with the rise of the middle class, initially based on the Veterans, but soon encompassing families that moved into the cities and the suburbs. This new class saw income and spending possibility rising in step with the upgrading of consumption habits and life styles.
Is there anything like that in sight? For one thing on the income distribution side there is an opposite process, with large numbers pushed out of the middle class into a condition just above or barely keeping up with subsistence that is not favourable to expansionary consumption evolution. Samuelson has recently noticed that de-regulation has a negative effect on income distribution, and it is plain we have been deregulating everything, from labour markets to financial market, to an extent never seen before. (One may wonder whether one would come to the same conclusion by reading economics textbooks, including Samuelson's.)
There is then hardly any basis for a mass upgrading of consumption and life styles. More fundamentally, new products and new industries seem incapable of affording the kind of virtuous cycle going from technology to large investment to new products/industries capable of creating dynamism in the macro economy and the consumption patterns of the majority of the people. And that was the basis of the boom of the 1960s. Its crisis is the background of the stagnation tendencies revealed in the 1970s. Growth slowed down to replacement and a new pattern of growth emerged where the fundamental problem was the slow growth of the market.
-Can we count of new technologies for expansion?
ICTs: the technology, investment, new markets relationship
The underlying issue is that there were no longer positive circumstances left in the Post-War technology, investment, new market relationship. The new pattern was articulated differently in the 1980s and 1990s; it was combined with a rising globalization that, although not a new phenomenon in itself, was changing the relationship of economic and political power between the center and the periphery of the world economy. (Gualerzi, 2007) The expansion of the 1990s compares favourably to the slow growth of the 1980s. Indeed one can argue that the 1990s witness a coming of age of information technologies that were finally felt in a massive way so to create an investment boom and (admittedly overblown) expectations of a large transformation leading to new markets (Gualerzi, 2010) . ICTs in the 1990s illustrate well the fundamental problem with technology driven development. The problem is not the pace of technological change, which actually accelerated considerably in those years, and it did stimulate a boom, but it lasted only a few years, and it fed right into the current crisis. The substitute of the technological bubble was the real estate bubble, and it left the economy in the precarious state marred with the prospects of a weak and slow recovery. In fact, it cannot fully recover unless it finds a new expansion path.
Two traits of ICTs need to be recalled. It is well known, although often played down, that new technology -and productivity growth -can cause technological unemployment. Computerization with its effects on automation raises indeed the problem of job loss.
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ICTs, however, do more than create technological unemployment; they can also destroy markets. Of course innovation has always had a destructive side.
12 But this appears to be different. The new information technologies create extensive externalities, and it is these externalities, which are by definition free, that can undermine whole industries.
13
This only stresses the fact that ICT-driven transformation results in new jobs only if their labour displacing and market-destruction effects are more than compensated by the growth of demand and the formation of new markets. That explain the "exuberance" as an Internet scenario of development (Gualerzi, 2001 ) was maturing in the second part of the 1990s, but also the collapse that followed, as the prospects of further market creation appeared badly overestimated. The point is that to become a new engine of growth a technology must create new markets on a large enough scale. It is not the speed of diffusion, with its inevitable delays and accelerations, the key point, but rather the prospects of market creation it rises, finding a new field of customers. But that fundamentally depends on a transformation of consumption patterns such to validate the initial investment in innovation and sustain a long term investment expansion. That in turns calls for an examination of the barriers that have to be overcome in order to bring about a fundamental transformation of consumption patterns. This is about changing the character of consumption in an advanced economy, a question little investigated yet crucial for the question of new markets and investment. One aspect of this large question is precisely the diffusion of ICTs products and the Internet.
New consumers electronics, cell phones and computer networks -including hardware and software for network access -are the most identifiable items of the ICTs-driven consumption transformation, affecting entertainment, the 'culture industry', education, journalism and the media tourism and domestic life, but also developing new markets concerning information, communication, access and mobility. These are critical consumption markets in advanced industrial economies. The process of change of consumption patterns was sustained by a rapid diffusion of ICT products and the Internet, combined with constant technical improvements, which add new features to the successive new generations of these products, subject to a rapid obsolescence for the more sophisticated consumers. From status symbols and/or items for limited specialized communities (the scientific community) or technology freaks, these innovations have become in a few years established consumers items, following a diffusion path that is typical of mass consumption.
Barriers to consumption transformation and new markets
The ICT-driven transformation of consumption patterns, however, has also shown numerous peculiarities and difficulties, which highlight why the diffusion process may not result in the same rapid growth of the market as we have seen in the past. Some important factors can act as a constraint on this development process.
13 This seems to have happened in the case of music; the new 'sharing' technologies proved highly destructive, undermining markets, eliminating not only jobs but whole businesses. Newspapers may be next. The distribution of movies is shaky; cell phones are undermining landlines, and the use of the Internet for phoning may further undermine both. It is especially notable that since most of the new products are 'collective' -meaning that consuming them is wholly or in part a joint process -a 'sharing' technology on a network (pirating, sometimes) will make them effectively free. Besides music, this is happening with movies, books, news, some kinds of artwork, and so on. The old forms of marketing no longer apply, and it is often not clear whether new methods will be as profitable.
Computer literacy and skills acquisition. Users familiarity with advanced technology and services is fundamental, especially for the spread of computers and the Internet in the home. An important prerequisite is then a certain degree of education and computer literacy. Computer literacy and users familiarity depend on three factors. First, an "age" factor , which closely relates higher level of keyboard literacy to younger generations. We might say that in the 1990s a first generation of people developed the capacity to use effectively Internet and Internet services. Second, experience in the early years, conceivably moving to the teens and the twenties what has been learned in their thirties and forties by an earlier generation, leaves a mark, both on life style development and consumption decisions, influencing the pattern of need development. Notice that older generations might be, and in many cases have been, completely cut off this kind of development. We get then to the third aspect, that is precisely that of skills. There are severe constraint imposed on those that are not capable or willing to acquire the skills necessary to an effective use of technology and that concerns an array of new possibilities of consumption. 14 As for older skills, learned on a mass basis, for example typing, or driving a car, these new basic skills must be acquired in an early age. But, these are more than before complex. Typing requires eye and manual coordination, keyboard proficiency adds thinking and planning to those. We further observe that this development is contingent on time allocation and fees for access. (Note that time is involved in acquiring skills, but then skills may cut the time to perform certain operations).
Computer literacy and familiarity, depending on age, early experience and skills acquisition, works then as a limiting factor on the transformation based on the Internet and "virtual reality" as a viable notion for economic development. But limitations may have an altogether different nature.
Time in the home and domestic capital. The Internet affects the allocation of time between the production-consumption activities (a typical example might be that of cooking meals) that take place in the private, domestic sphere. All too often the shift of certain functions away from the market to the private time and the home setting (which by the way can be of very different quality and "capital intensity") is treated as a shift at zero cost. Saving the financial and time costs of physical mobility, as well as the fees imposed by service companies, the access provided by Internet to services appears a net gain. The typical example might be reserving an airplane ticket or organizing a vacation. This shift has, however, several critical aspects.
For one thing it gives a new angle to the fact that "consumption takes time." Time uses have been discussed as part of the traditional consumer choice problem. 15 Here the point is that the new technologies enter the home and the "production" of services requires time that was previously available for other uses. Home computerization and the Internet make very clear that technology affects consumption also through this channel.
Access is an empty notion without the time it requires. This is often overlooked, in so far it is assumed to be negligible, per se and/or with respect to the time it saves. It must be noted that time spent in simple operations may be, and often is, longer than expected, given unavailability of the central units or the failure of the connecting link. This may pose a 14 Petit and Soete (2002) have discussed the issue, focusing on the skill-biased nature of technological change. They argue an emerging duality between those who acquire skills through their jobs, and those who do not. The gap of those who are increasingly left behind in this learning process conceivably affects also consumption patterns. 15 Steedman (2001) .
further constraint at time allocation, since the operation needs to repeated according to some kind of individual day timetable. Indeed, saying that "information is available on the web" spells out another subtle form of technological determinism. Information is available only in principle, the real issue being its accessibility, depending on quality of the interface, webs design and search engines, which can, and have been, improved.
16 Nevertheless, quality and improved management of web sites is unlikely to easily solve the problem. In any case, accessing information on the web becomes a domestic operation, fitting into the time spent home, through planning and changes in life style.
If time use is an "hidden cost", other costs, although also overlooked, are quite tangible. The most obvious concern the fact that neither the equipment nor Internet access are free, simply they are comprised in what has become an higher "domestic capital", as electric appliances and house bills. Second, these home-based activities rely on a fundamental capital that is the house itself.
The shift to domestic production of services made possible especially by the Internet is not a shift without cost, but rather a trade off between costs, and towards costs (the free time of individuals in their home) that are hard to quantify, but nevertheless exist. Both the capital costs and the time costs involved in this trade off are often ignored, whereas they affect both the experience and the economic impact of ICTs.
The notion of home and place. That acquires a further connotation when considered in light of a general pattern of transformation. In the theory of Transformational Growth (Nell, 1998) one of the main sources of demand growth is the industrialization of domestic production, moving outside the home the production of goods and services. We can now observe that ICTs and the Internet are partially reversing this tendency, re-importing some functions within domestic production. Thus, the necessity to observe the often neglected costs of transformation and the way that affects the consumption sphere through changes in domestic life. But we can take the analysis a step further, observing how ICTs have changed the very notion of home. The home is now the base for accessing virtual reality; the place par excellence, as such full of personal history and projections, is filled by information, images and contents available on the Web. It is therefore immersed in virtual reality, becoming part of a virtual space. To that extent it loses the sense of place and identity that is typical of the private domestic sphere.
17 How this change of meaning and definition of the domestic sphere might affect consumption activities and the development process is a matter of elaborating on the social and economic implications. We can, however, suggest that it might raise new constraints connected to anthropological transformation it implies.
Finally, we would like to note that there are still other limitations, coming from negative externalities. The domestic use of ICT products and access to virtual reality in particular, may have costs that are more largely social than strictly economic. There are indications that these costs may lie, for instance, in the phenomena of addiction that have been observed by clinical research. 16 One can see in this light the success of Google, now contending to Microsoft a leadership position in the market. 17 The loss of the identity of places in post-modernity is a theme made popular by anthropologist Mark Auge.
Why new technologies do not breed strong expansion
These barriers were underestimated when perceived at all. While we can interpret the boom and the exuberance of the stock market in the 1990s as an instance of rushing in to be the first 19 , we can explain the bust in terms of the more sober consideration of the limitations that ICTs encounter to create new markets after the initial promise. The technological, economic and social bottlenecks made an Internet scenario of development unrealistic, folding back investment spending and bringing to collapse the expansion.
The fundamental limit of another step in ICT-driven development appears to be a deeper transformation of production and consumption. But a deeper transformation might depend on changes of economic and social organization and institutions that are hardly in sight, in fact difficult even to delineate. What the 1990s have shown are therefore the complexities and difficulty that stand in the way of ICTs becoming a new engine of growth as other general purpose technologies (or epoch making innovations) have done in the past. In this light the end of the 1990s boom appears to be more than an adjustment in a continuing growth path, rather a severe halt and precisely for its capacity to create new markets.
The above mentioned barriers to consumption transformation highlight that difficulty. Underneath is the question of the economic feasibility and social desirability of a much deeper transformation capable of creating new markets. Indeed, computers are not dynamos. Despite their mass diffusion, computerization and the Internet, the effects on consumers markets is constrained by new barriers that are specific to the particular path of transformation they drive. This explains why technological change did not and is not having the same results it had in other cycles of expansion. Cell phones and the Internet are not car or television sets, precisely because they require a much deeper social adaptation to fully exploit their potential -nor is clear what that would be and might imply in terms of social life and required institutional change. ICTs do not follow the usual path in which diffusion breeds a series of interconnected expansion of new markets; in the end it tends to have a much weaker expansive effects and is less of a stimulus to large investment. We might say we have now a first clear picture of the limits on the Information economy and society.
New markets in the 2000s
The limiting factors, together with the balance of costs and benefits, put in perspective the question of the transformation of consumption and help to explain why new markets (expected demand growth) failed to materialize at the anticipated scale and pace. They also shed a negative light on the prospects on a resumption of growth based on more ICT-driven transformation. In other words, we cannot expect a new investment boom based on this technological frontier. This is the more so considering what happened to the ICT sector and to the economy as a whole in the 2000s.
The diffusion of ICTs products and the Internet together with some trends of transformation have continued unabated, sustained by the same forces of computerization and access. Still, there was not a new expansive phase. Rather a consolidation of the ICTs research-industrial complex. In this respect, we can note the retreat of investment and recall that restructuring is not in general favorable to market creation. Technology development -and productivity growth -continued, in direction that were already articulated in the 1990s. However, the positive aspects of the boom dissipated into a new slowdown of the economy. We have seen above that, while that lasted throughout most of 2003, the recovery that followed was incubating a crisis which is said to compare to the great Depression. The recovery was pulled by a booming households debt sustaining consumption, eventually collapsing in a liquidity crisis that triggered a recession. This strongly suggest that there has not been an alternative to the leading role played by ICTs in the 1990s.
At the same time, some trends of development have returned to the fore in the 2000s, shifting the attention away from Hi-Tech and further complicating the question of what might be the future directions of market creation. These developments center on energy and the environment, which appear closely related issues, both reaching a new critical stage. In this respect, one can notice on the one hand, the pressure created by the rise of oil prices 20 and the uncertainties about oil reserves and market prospects; on the other hand, the new step forward of the alternative energy industry, indeed a rapidly growing market. The developments in the areas of energy and the environment are determining a mounting pressure on the transportation and automobile industries. The latter is going through a even deeper process of crisis and consolidation, while it is open the search for an alternative to the internal combustion engine and/or to the automobile as the master of private transportation.
This sparse observation suggests that we should think of new markets in broader terms and beyond the association with Hi-Tech. 21 At the same time, we ought to note that, despite their importance, these developments have not so far been sufficient to establish a pattern of growth centered on these (potential) new markets.
Concluding Remarks and research questions
So the real trap in which the economy is caught is that while new technologies are not mobilizing enough resources (arguably because they are not creating enough of a structural transformation), there are no other well articulated directions of transformation creating the prospects for new markets and large investment. While the effects of technological change are not comparable to those experienced in other phases, the income distribution and social polarization tend to discourage a push into the middle class which had a tremendous impetuous in creating markets in the 1960s.
This should be seen as a warning for the current discussion on the stimulation package and the return to fiscal policy as a way to the resumption of solid economic growth. It reminds us that even a strong stimulus is not likely to have the same effects it might have in profoundly different circumstances than those facing the US economy at the end of the 2000s. This is not to say that there are no possible new industries and new markets. As mentioned above some alternatives did take hold in the 2000s. Although so far unable to give a decisive impetus to growth, they might do so in the future as the often mentioned prospects of green revolution suggest. Thus, the current crisis brings back to the fundamentals the analysis of expansion of market economies. This is the real challenge posed to economic theory and it is not too well addressed in the debate among economists.
Krugman and Akerlof-Schiller outline what economists should do to bring back Keynesian ideas into theory and policy. Can that be a view of the crisis based on the negative effects of animal spirits and market imperfections ? Is behavioural economics -which is by no means a complete novelty -the main alley to develop the Keynesian insight into depression and effective demand ? Is that the only answer to the failure of the economic doctrine? Prominent Keynesian economists seem to discard a "rational" explanation for market operation, and thus for crisis and unemployment. But from their own criticism of macroeconomics it follows that it is the rationality implied by perfect markets which is called into question. There seems to be room for more than asserting irrational behaviour and market imperfections as the key to economic fluctuations. (Notice: we are not dealing with short term, relatively mild fluctuations, but the possibility of long run stagnation.) Should realism of analysis and consideration for the "human" element be associated with being irrational? Although not new, it is somewhat surprising to find this line of reasoning proposed as an answer to the current crisis.
This needs to be examined in a history of economic analysis perspective. It asks for a development and clarification of Keynesian theory. The particular angle from which the paper pursues that goal is bringing into focus the way fluctuations and depression are intertwined with the rise (rather the creation) of new markets. That can also take us beyond the question of irrational behaviour.
Investment decisions find in the prospects of new markets a clear foundations. While leaving room for a number of influences, such as those contained in the notion of long run expectations, that spells out a perfectly rational reason to proceed or delay investment spending. That does not do away with the notion of an uncertain future and therefore implies no deterministic view of the market operation, such as that contained in the notion of rationality associated with perfect markets. But uncertain future -and animal spiritscan certainly be married with the notion of "a market to be". When focusing on "irrational exuberance "and bubbles (Schiller, 2005) we should note that not all bubbles are alike. The technological bubble of the late 1990s was driven by a real transformation. We do not need to subscribe to irrational behaviour to explain what is ultimately driven by the potential for new markets of new technologies.
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The second element of the return to Keynesian ideas brought about by the crisis is the attention given to government intervention and in particular to fiscal policy. Reconstructing macroeconomic thinking, and its (ir)relevance for the crisis, Krugman highlights the importance of the latter as opposed to monetary policy or laissez faire. The seriousness of the crisis set aside the debate with a consensus around the idea of saving banks and stimulate of the economy. The question is whether a fiscal stimulus sustained by deficit spending may restart the economy. While subsidies to house and car sales might have helped to stop the downturn and prevented the crisis from becoming unmanageable, 23 it is the set of circumstances of the economy that ultimately determines the effectiveness of the 22 "the perception of potential market and the effort to take advantage of it drove investment spending and fostered stock market rise. But the expected transformation determined also the overbuilding of capacity and speculation drove the stock market out of control. This is a more complete explanation than irrational exuberance. It was not irrational, not like the tulip mania" (Gualerzi, 2010, p. 134) 23 That might account for the GNP performance in the third quarter of 2009, which was announced to be an unexpected 3.5%. The growth rate was again positive after four quarters. Commentaries were however mostly cautious about speaking of a turn-around of the economy.
stimulus. The US, and other economies, for example Germany, may have a debt situation that allows them for a strong and prolonged stimulus. Other countries might not be in the same position. 24 Another aspect of the problem is to what extent the stimulus is subdivided between income support, tax reduction and public investment.
All the same, the question remains; as the historical episodes examined above confirm, and the reference to the New Deal suggests, public intervention and public investment will have limited effects unless the prospects of new markets is created. This is an "independent" question to be raised, it cannot be answered referring to the prospects of the new technologies or the power of market mechanisms. Equally important is to go beyond the idea that the stimulus will operate through the channel of aggregate demand and that will trickle down to the entire economy. That might not be sufficient, unless the economy sets in a new growth pattern. The Keynesian legacy needs to be brought up to the task of confronting the risk of long run depression in much different conditions than those faced by Keynes himself. 25 Key questions are that of effective demand in the long run, autonomous investment and new markets.
There is then another research agenda quite distinct (although not necessarily conflicting) from that indicated by Krugman and Akerlof-Schiller. Two themes especially are important. One concerns a rethinking of public intervention in the economy and the role of economic policy in setting up new prospects for investment. Another concerns a rethinking of consumption and its transformation. Especially the changing character of consumption in advanced industrial economies is a little investigated crucial question, which was examined in this paper with respect to the diffusion of ICTs products and the Internet.
This suggests the possible directions along which economic thought becomes relevant for the study of crisis and long term depression. The point is to refocus attention on the creation of new markets and the debate on the stimulus packages should be looked at in this light. In the end, the Long Run does not take care of itself and a reformulation of a growth scenario is necessary.
